In a recent article Davidson, Lawrence and Wilson propose a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation and goods of di¤er-ent quality, tax evasion can be an optimal device. Here, we show that this result, although quite interesting, cannot be generalised to a framework where Government activity consists of supplying merit goods and levying taxes to …nance their provision.
Introduction
In a recent article Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2005) , hereafter DMW, present a model showing that, in the presence of distortionary taxation, tax evasion can be an optimal strategy which, in some special cases, allows replication of a …rst best tax system. The model stands on four basic assumptions: a) there are two types of goods in the economy: a numeraire and another good that is produced in several qualities; b) goods are produced using Leontief technologies; c) consumers'utilities are additive, and they di¤er in their evaluation of quality (the marginal utility of quality is however decreasing); d) Central Government levies taxes on the good with several varieties to …nance the production of a preset level of public goods.
Although utility is linear, the assumption of decreasing marginal utility, combined with a non-linear aggregation of linear preferences, allows the authors to show that uniform tax is distortionary and that in some cases evasion can improve welfare. Given a probability of being caught, Central Government will then set a …ne to a level that allows an optimal tax evasion; in this way the tax rate and the …ne levied are not uniform and the authors say that welfare improves. 1 In this work we use the framework proposed by DMW to study Department of Economics, University of Brescia, Via S. Faustino, 74b, 25122 Brescia (Italy). E-mail: levaggi@eco.unibs.it. 1 In DMW's framework in fact tax evasion when possible is complete and the Government revenue is given by the …nes on tax evasion. 1 the scope for tax evasion in an environment where the taxed good is a merit good. We assume that the Government produces the low quality good and subsidizes its consumption whereas the private sector produces the high quality good (which is not subsidized). We believe that this environment is quite suitable to represent Government activity which is more oriented towards the production of merit rather than public goods. 2 2 Merit goods, public provision and optimal tax
As in DMW, we assume a simple economy where two classes of goods are produced: a quality homogenous numeraire, and a private good whose quality can be either low ( L ) or high ( H > L ). Each agent is endowed with a given amount of the numeraire and he decides whether to buy a single unit of the other good and of which quality. Departing from DMW, we assume that the two-quality product is a merit good. Accordingly, the Government produces and promotes the consumption of the merit good by subsidizing the low quality variety ( L ) at rate (1 ) so that the price paid by the …nal user is a fraction of the low quality good price P L . Only the low quality is subsidized in order to reduce as far as possible the burden of Government activity. We believe that health care and education could be two relevant examples. In fact, they are produced both in the public and the private sector, but with di¤erent standards as regards quality 3 and prices. The utility function of agent i who buys the good whose quality is j 2 fL; Hg can be written as
where v is an increasing and concave function of the quality ( j ) and is the same for any agent, E i is the numeraire endowment of agent i (which can be transformed into either labour or capital), P j ( j ) is the price of the good j as a strictly increasing function of the quality j , and i 2 [0; 1] is a preference agent speci…c parameter and is distributed according to the continuous density function h ( ). Although h ( ) is known by the Government, each single value of is private information to the consumer. This is the reason why subsidies and taxation can be applied to goods, but they cannot depend on personal characteristics of the consumers. This means that, as in DWM, an optimal tax system cannot be de…ned. The subsidy j is either zero for the high quality good or constant for the low quality good (i.e. L = and H = 1). The reason for subsidizing only the low quality good is twofold: (i) since the public expenditure is always distortionary, it should be kept to the minimum, and (ii)
if the low quality merit good satis…es consumer needs, there is no reason to subsidize another good that only di¤ers in its quality content. Given the absence of depreciation and assuming zero interest rate, zero profits and a Leontief production function, both inputs are paid the same cost W and in equilibrium prices for the goods must satisfy:
where t j is the tax on good j.
4 Any agent i may behave in three di¤erent ways as regards the choice of the merit good:
1. he does not buy it; this happens if and only if he has a preference i such that
2. he buys the high quality product; this happens if and only if he has a preference i such that
3. he buys a low quality product, this happens if and only if he has a prefer-
Other things being equal, the level of discriminates between the market for the public and the private varieties since it lowers L and increases H . However, in the context of a full general equilibrium, this conclusion might be too simplistic since the e¤ect of the tax system should also be studied. To do so, let's start by studying a framework without tax evasion and where the two goods can be taxed at di¤erent rates.Then, the Government solves the following problem
subject to the budget constraint
Before showing the main result, let's introduce a de…nition.
4 DMW choose to model the tax rate in a slightly di¤erent way. Let us call j their tax rate, then in their model the link between price P j and cost W j is given by P j = W j 1 j . We made our choice in order to simplify the ongoing computations and, nevertheless, our result can be traced back to that of DMW through the following euqalities:
De…nition 1 A tax-subsidy system (t H ; t L ; ) is said to be e¤ ective if and only if the indirect utility function of the agent is di¤ erent from the one obtained with (t H = 0; t L = 0; = 1).
Let's de…ne
as the probability that the parameter of an agent takes values lower than X. Then we can conclude what follows.
Proposition 2 Given Problem (1) under the constraint (2) and if
, then the only e¤ ective tax-subsidy system is given by
Proof. See Appendix 3. Accordingly, we have L = 0 which means that the optimal taxes and subsidy are set so that everybody will buy one of the goods. Central Government optimally …nances the whole consumption of the merit good. This result is quite interesting because in this context tax evasion in its classical meaning is simply not possible. The burden of providing the merit good to the consumers that ask for the low quality good cannot be shifted. The only e¤ect tax evasion might have is to reduce the number of users of the lower quality service by making it more convenient for the marginal consumer to shift to the higher quality consumption. In this case, public expediture and the tax burden would shrink. To check whether this e¤ect exists and if it is welfare improving, let's …rst examine the decision of the …rm to evade.
As in DMW, we assume that the …nal consumer bene…ts from tax evasion through a reduction in the price of the good he buys. Tax evasion is possible, but there is a probability of being caught. In this case, the …rm should pay a …ne f proportional to the cost of production. Firms are assumed to be risk neutral; this means that they evade if
which can be written as f < t H :
Accordingly, in order to avoid tax evasion, Central Government should set f such that f = t H . In DMW the implicit assumption is that Central Government chooses to set f to a level that allows tax evasion. In this way the e¤ective tax rate paid in the two sectors is di¤erent and welfare improves. Does this result hold in the presence of a merit good? Our answer is no. To show this, let's assume, as in DMW, that Central Government foresees that the …rms in the private sector may evade if the …ne and the probability of being caught are suitably chosen. If such an instrument were welfare improving, we should expect the Government to allow tax evasion. We introduce this assumption in our model and determine Central Government optimal policy. When evasion is taken into account, the price of the high quality good could be either W H when the …rm evades, or W H (1 + f ) when the …rm evades and is caught. Accordingly, the expected price for good with quality H will be
and the budget constraint for the Government becomes
while the objective function is
We can immediately see that the new problem and constraint have the same structure as Problem (1) and constraint (2) once f is substituted by t H . Accordingly, the solution is
Thus, Central Government sets the …ne at the lowest level not allowing tax evasion. This means that in the presence of a merit good it is not optimal to arti…cially decrease the price of the good produced in the private sector through tax evasion. In this system tax evasion might of course still exist if, as it is plausible to assume, Central Goverment is not able to observe the technology of production and the exact cost of production. 6 If this is the case, there will be tax evasion in equilibrium, but at the cost of decreasing total welfare. This means that even in this very simple model where the costs of tax evasion in terms of controls and marginal cost of public funds (Levaggi, 2007) are not considered, tax evasion is not welfare improving. Thus, tax evasion is not always an optimal tax device, something that has been pointed out also by Davidson, Martin and Wilson (2006) themselves. We belive that the article proposed by the authors is a good starting point for studying the problem from a di¤erent perspective, in ways that the literature has not explored so far.
Demonstration of Proposition 2
Given Problem (1) and the constraint (2), we can write the Lagrangean by using the function H de…ned in (3) as follows
where: is the Lagrangean multiplier,
and accordingly, the system of the …rst derivatives of L with respect to t H , t L , , and is
We highlight that Equations (5) and (6) have a factor in common. Accordingly, we can distinguish three main cases.
1. 6 = 0 and t L 6 = 1: in this case Equation (5) can be di vided by and Equation (6) can be di vided by (1 + t L ). So, the system of the …rst order conditions contains just three equations:
If we take the value (1 (1 + t L )) W L from the last equation and we substitute it in the …rst two equations we have
and, accordingly
which means that t L = 1 + 1 ;
for any value of . Since in this case
then the indirect utility function is
which is exactly the same as we would have without any public intervention. Given De…nition 1, then this tax-subsidy system is not e¤ective.
Either
= 0 and t L 6 = 1 or 6 = 0 and t L = 1: in this case either Equation (5) or Equation (6) is always veri…ed. Furthermore, we have L = 0 and H L = 0. In both cases the system of the …rst order conditions contains the same three equations:
which has no solution for t H , t L , and . Accordingly, this case is not relevant.
3.
= 0 and t L = 1. In this case L = 0 and H L = 0 and Equations (5) and (6) are always veri…ed for any values of t H and . Thus, we still have to solve the following system of two equations
from which we easily obtain
